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A COMPARISON OF PUBLIC-PRIVATE 
PARTNERSHIPS IN NIGERIA & SOUTH AFRICA 
INTRODUCTION 
In September 2017, Chidi Izuwa, acting Director General of Nigeria’s 
Infrastructure Concession Regulatory Commission (ICRC), stated Nigeria 
would need approximately $100 billion over the next six years to finance 
quality infrastructure in the country.1 In many countries, inadequate 
infrastructure continues to stifle economic, social, and political growth.2 In 
response to the lack of funding and need for growth, countries have turned 
to private funding, through public-private partnerships (PPPs) for 
example, to meet these development needs.3 PPPs are “long-term 
contractual arrangements between the government and a private partner 
whereby the latter delivers and funds public services using a capital asset, 
sharing the associated risks.”4 
                                                        
1  Kunle Aderinokun, Obinna Chima, & Nume Ekeghe, ICRC: $100bn Required for Nigeria’s 
Infrastructure Development, THIS DAY (Sept. 18, 2017), 
www.thisdaylive.com/index.php/2017/09/18/icrc-100bn-required-for-nigerias-infrastructure-
development. 
2  “Poor infrastructure is often a reflection of constraints that governments face, for example, 
lack of public funds, poor planning, or weak analysis underpinning project preparation.” WORLD 
BANK GRP., WORLD BANK GROUP SUPPORT TO PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS: LESSONS FROM 
EXPERIENCE IN CLIENT COUNTRIES, FY02-12 vi (2014), 
ieg.worldbankgroup.org/sites/default/files/Data/Evaluation/files/ppp_eval_updated2.pdf; “Addressing 
these challenges will require a substantially larger annual level of investment in infrastructure, a 
significant increase in annual allocations for routine and periodic maintenance to ensure reliable 
infrastructure services, and increased attention to the institutional arrangements that support the 
infrastructure network of the country and the related services.” AFRICAN DEV. BANK, AN 
INFRASTRUCTURE ACTION PLAN FOR NIGERIA: CLOSING THE INFRASTRUCTURE GAP AND 
ACCELERATING ECONOMIC TRANSFORMATION 17 (Aug. 8, 2013) 
https://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Project-and-
Operations/An_Infrastructure_Action_Plan_for_Nigeria_-
_Closing_the_Infrastructure_Gap_and_Accelerating_Economic_Transformation.pdf. 
3  “African leaders are now throwing their nets wider and increasingly courting entrepreneurs 
and the private sector in general for partnerships in development. They have realised that sustainable 
economic growth on the continent cannot be achieved quickly without investments from both private 
and public sectors.” An Integrated Africa: A Boon to the Private Sector, ZIMBABWE DAILY (Feb. 8, 
2018), https://www.thezimbabwedaily.com/news/181259-an-integrated-africa-a-boon-to-the-private-
sector.html. 
4  ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV. (OECD), RECOMMENDATION OF THE COUNCIL ON 
PRINCIPLES FOR PUBLIC GOVERNANCE OF PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS 18 (May 2012) [hereinafter 
OECD], https://www.oecd.org/governance/budgeting/PPP-Recommendation.pdf. 
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While Nigeria and South Africa cumulatively account for almost half 
of Sub-Saharan Africa’s gross domestic product,5 their infrastructural 
makeups are vastly different.6 In a 2015 study commissioned by the 
Public-Private Infrastructure Advisory Facility and the World Bank 
Group, the Economist Intelligence Unit profiled the operational maturity 
of nineteen African countries.7 South Africa ranked first as the most 
mature country on the list.8 South Africa was also the only country with 
market depth sufficiently capable of financing long-term investments.9 
While South Africa was top-ranked and the only country listed as 
“Developed,”10 Nigeria ranked twelfth with an “Emerging” capacity to 
carry out sustainable PPPs.11  
This Note will examine the regulatory and legal frameworks governing 
PPPs in Nigeria and South Africa.12 This Note will also compare the 
enforcement, transparency, and effectiveness of PPPs within these legal 
and regulatory frameworks.13 Lastly, this Note will discuss the social and 
cultural impact of PPPs within Nigeria and South Africa.14 In comparing 
global, national, and local frameworks, this Note will examine why South 
Africa has made great progress and what Nigeria can adopt from South 
Africa’s success.15 This Note will also discuss recommendations Nigeria’s 
infrastructure industries can implement to develop a full PPP regime that 
                                                        
5  David Malingha Doya, Worst May Be Over As Biggest Africa Economies End Growth 
Rut, BLOOMBERG MKTS. (Sept. 3, 2017), www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-09-03/worst-may-
be-over-as-africa-s-biggest-economies-emerge-from-rut. 
6  See generally infra Sections III.A.1-2. (Nigerian states have autonomous PPP regimes 
separate from the federal PPP structure. South Africa’s PPP structure is a centralized unit implemented 
through the National Treasury.). 
7  The Economist Intelligence Unit is the research division of the Economist Group, publisher 
of the Economist. The Infrascope index comprises of nineteen qualitative and quantitative indicators. 
Each indicator had its own rubric and scoring system. The quantitative indicators are drawn from the 
Risk Briefing service of the Economist Intelligence Unit and World Bank. The qualitative indicators 
are drawn from primary sources, secondary sources, and data sources. Primary sources include legal 
texts, government websites, interviews, and press reports. ECONOMIST INTELLIGENCE 
UNIT, EVALUATING THE ENVIRONMENT FOR PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS IN AFRICA: THE 2015 
INFRASCOPE 7 (2015), https://ppiaf.org/documents/2399/download. 
8  Id. at 9. 
9  Id. at 10. 
10  Based on the overall scores from the indicators, each country was categorized as “Mature” 
(80-100), “Developed” (60-79.9), “Emerging” (30-59.9), or “Nascent” (0-29.9). Id. at 9. 
11  Id.  
12  See generally infra Section III.A.  
13  See generally infra Section III.B. 
14  See generally infra Section III.C. 
15  See generally infra Section IV. 
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will benefit not only the industries themselves but also stakeholders and 
neighboring communities.16  
The most vital recommendation is reform to Nigeria’s PPP 
framework.17 This Note suggests the implementation of a hybrid PPP 
framework to replace the current decentralized system.18 Further, this Note 
encourages serious consideration of marginalized tribal/ethnic groups and 
communities that will be affected by PPP projects.19 Lastly, this Note 
emphasizes the importance of consistency in PPP policies and programs in 
order to bring stability and legitimacy to the Nigerian PPP regime.20  
I.  BACKGROUND 
For years, African countries have been considered the “preeminent 
emerging markets investment destination, attracting global investors 
across all sectors.”21 Much of the investment, which has led to growth in 
Africa’s leading economies, is from the flow of foreign capital from 
private sources.22 The flow of foreign capital is directed most prevalently 
towards infrastructure.23 Perplexing, however, is that despite immense 
investment in African infrastructure and development, there has been little 
improvement in human development, infrastructural networks, business 
growth, or interdependence and coordination among neighboring cities, 
states, and countries.24 As Africa is the least economically integrated 
continent in the world, there is great need for sound infrastructure in order 
                                                        
16  Id. 
17  See generally infra Section IV.A. 
18  Id. 
19  See generally infra Section IV.B. 
20  See generally infra Section IV.C. 
21  Christopher Olobo, 6 Tips for plugging Africa’s Infrastructure Gap Through Public-Private 
Partnerships, THE WORLD BANK: INFRASTRUCTURE & PUB.-PRIV. PARTNERSHIPS BLOG (Nov. 1, 
2016), http://blogs.worldbank.org/ppps/6-tips-plugging-africa-s-infrastructure-gap-through-public-
private-partnerships.  
22  Michael Heyink, Private Equity: A Value Add Infrastructure Investor, in INTO AFRICA 6 
(Michael Osu ed., Aug. 2016), 
http://www.capitalmarketsinafrica.com/INTOAFRICA/INTOAFRICA_AUGUST_2016.pdf. 
23  Id. 
24  Josua Loots, Public-Private Partnerships for Infrastructure Development in Africa: The 
Need for Human Rights-Focused Regulation, HEINRICH BÖLL STIFTUNG (June 14, 2017), 
www.boell.de/en/2017/06/14/public-private-partnerships-infrastructure-development-africa-need-
human-rights-focused. 
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to boost intra-African trade and raise the continent’s competitiveness in 
the global economy.25  
To meet African development needs, the African Union (AU) created 
the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD), an economic 
development program, to offset some of the foreign development 
investment issues in Africa.26 Since the inception of NEPAD, programs 
directly targeted towards infrastructure and the leadership behind 
infrastructure development have emerged.27 One such program is the 
Program for Infrastructure Development in Africa (PIDA).28 PIDA 
promotes “regional economic integration by building mutually beneficial 
infrastructure and strengthening the ability of countries to trade and 
establish regional value chains for increased competitiveness.”29 In regards 
to leadership, the Presidential Infrastructure Champion Initiative (PICI) 
was created to push African leaders to accelerate infrastructure 
development goals under PIDA.30 The goal of both PIDA and PICI is to 
promote economic growth and development between African countries 
through enhanced visibility, cleared bottlenecks, and coordination of 
resource mobilization.31 However, these goals are only attainable through 
large financial investments, resulting in the need for private financing.32 
PPPs represent a major route to securing private financing. PPPs have 
been defined in different ways by various organizations. The Organization 
for Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD), for example, 
provides a flexible definition of PPPs as long-term contractual 
arrangements between the government and a private partner whereby the 
latter funds and delivers public services using a capital asset, sharing the 
                                                        
25  Programme for Infrastructure Development in Africa (PIDA), NEPAD, 
www.nepad.org/programme/programme-infrastructure-development-africa-pida (last visited Jan. 31, 
2018). 
26  NEPAD focuses on the economic development of the African Union through investment in 
the following: “Human capital development (skills, youth, employment, and women empowerment);  
Industrialization, science, technology and innovation; Regional integration, infrastructure (energy, 
water, transport) and trade; Natural resources governance and food security.” About Us, NEPAD, 
http://www.nepad.org/who-we-are/about-us (last visited Jan. 12, 2019). 
27  See infra note 28-31. 
28  PIDA was developed by the African Union Commission (AUC), NEPAD, the African 
Development Bank (AfDB), the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA) and the 
Regional Economic Communities (RECs). Programme for Infrastructure Development in Africa 
(PIDA), NEPAD, http://www.nepad.org/programme/programme-infrastructure-development-africa-
pida (last visited Jan. 31, 2018). 
29  Arab Maghreb Union, NEPAD, https://www.nepad.org/where-we-work/region/90.  
30  Presidential Infrastructure Champion Initiative (PICI), NEPAD, 
http://www.nepad.org/programme-details/1006 (last visited Jan. 31, 2018). 
31  Loots, supra note 24. 
32  An Integrated Africa: A Boon to the Private Sector, supra note 3. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol18/iss3/9
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associated risks.33 Through this process, the government capitalizes on the 
skills, capital, and expertise of the private partner to perform substantial 
portions of the project.34 Because the government typically pays for 
projects incrementally, the public and private entities share risks and 
rewards.35 The government retains some measure of control through 
ownership of the project or contractual provisions allowing the public 
agency to dictate specific project processes.36 Over time the government 
will acquire complete ownership of the project.37 Due to the lack of 
funding, many developing countries continue to see significant potential 
and need for the increased use of PPPs to address infrastructure 
deficiencies.38  
While there are many criticisms of PPPs,39 the reasons developing 
countries seek PPPs remain relatively unchanged: the opportunity to gain 
the expertise and know-how, while utilizing private financing to build 
necessary infrastructure and increase economic status.40 The World Bank 
supports PPPs because of “the potential to close the infrastructure gap by 
leveraging scarce public funding and introducing private sector technology 
and innovation to provide better quality public services through improved 
operational efficiency.”41 The World Bank further states that 
improvements in infrastructure and social services contribute directly to 
economic growth and poverty reduction.42 The ability of PPPs to spur 
economic growth and reduce poverty are particularly important in 
underserved communities, such as Africa, where population growth has 
only led to increased destitution.43 It is imperative to improve 
infrastructure to provide better opportunities for underserved communities. 
                                                        
33  OECD, supra note 4. For the purposes of this Note, this is the definition of a PPP. 
34  PRACTICAL LAW FIN., PUBLIC PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS: ISSUES AND CONSIDERATIONS, Note 
3-504-9995, https://uk.practicallaw.thomsonreuters.com/3-504-9995?. 
35  Id. at 2. 
36  Id. 
37  Id. 
38  Many public agencies do not have available funding to finance these projects or banks 
willing to take risks on such large projects. WORLD BANK GRP., supra note 2. 
39  Disadvantages include high transaction costs, high financing costs, loss of operational 
control, loss of ongoing revenue source, and higher user fees. See PRACTICAL LAW FIN., supra note 
34. 
40  ECONOMIST INTELLIGENCE UNIT, supra note 7, at 10. Advantages also include risk transfer, 
the opportunity to construct the project, reduction of government debt, budget relief, cost savings, 
better performing assets, avoidance of underbidding, shorter construction periods, technical expertise, 
minimized waste, and revenue generation. 
41  WORLD BANK GRP., supra note 2, at 7. 
42  Id.  
43  KATHLEEN BEEGLE, LUC CHRISTIAENSEN, ANDREW DABALEN & ISIS GADDIS, POVERTY IN 
A RISING AFRICA 21 (2016) (ebook), https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/22575. 
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There are a variety of forms of PPPs. On a scale of the most public to 
the most private forms of PPP, the OECD distinguishes the following 
types: 
• Service contract44  
• Management contract45  
• Affermage and lease contracts46  
• Concession47  
• Build–operate–transfer (BOT) and similar arrangements 
(including BTO, BOO, DBO, DBFO)48 
• Joint venture.49 
Regardless of the type of PPP, governments must convince the private 
financier to invest in a given project.50 There are many variables that the 
private party will consider before entering into a PPP. One common 
                                                        
44  Service contracts involve the government hiring a private company to perform tasks or 
services for a specified period of time. The government then pays the private company a 
predetermined fee for their service. ASIAN DEV. BANK, PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIP HANDBOOK 29 
(2008), https://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/institutional-document/31484/public-private-
partnership.pdf. 
45  Management contracts expand the PPP services to include some or all of the management 
and operation of the service. The private company will have daily management control and authority 
while the government will be obligated for service provisions. Id at 31. 
46  Affermage contracts require the private company to be responsible for the entire service. 
They are also responsible for the quality and service standards. Typically, the duration for these kinds 
of contracts is about ten years with the option of being renewed for up to twenty years. The private 
company collects revenue from customers, pays the government entity the affermage fee and keeps the 
remaining revenue. Further, a lease contract imposes the financial risk of operation and maintenance 
on the private company. In addition, the private company retains the right to collect revenue from 
customers and makes a specified lease payment to the contracting authority. Id. at 33. 
47  A concession also requires the private company to be responsible for the full service, capital 
investment, and tariff collection from the end-users. Full services include “operation, maintenance, 
collection, management, and construction and rehabilitation of the system.” Id. at 34. The government 
is required to establish and enforce the performance standards of the private company. Id. 
48  These arrangements consist of a private company or consortium to finance and develop a 
new project. Upon completion of the contract, ownership is transferred to the government. “Variations 
on the basic BOT structure are”:  
build–transfer–operate (BTO) where the transfer to the public owner takes place at the 
conclusion of construction rather than at the end of the contract; build–own–operate 
(BOO) where the developer constructs and operates the facility without transferring 
ownership to the public sector; design– build–operate (DBO) where the private sector 
provides design, construction, and operation of the infrastructure project; design–
build–finance–operate (DBFO) where the responsibilities for designing, building, 
financing, and operating are bundled together and transferred to private sector partners.  
Id. at 37-39. 
49  Joint ventures require the government and private company to partner (either by forming a 
new company or assuming joint ownership of an existing company). Both parties will invest in the 
company and share the risk and benefits. Id. at 41.   
50  See infra note 52. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol18/iss3/9
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consideration is whether the end-user is able and willing to pay for this 
investment.51 Another consideration is whether a series of conditions can 
be met before considering the project. In order to assure payment for the 
service and the success of the PPP, the government will need to 
demonstrate the following are present in-country: 
1. Political stability; 
2. A continuous pipeline of bankable projects; 
3. Transparent and efficient procurement; 
4. Enforceability of contracts; 
5. Equitable sharing of risks with the public sector; and 
6. Certainty of the envisaged future cash flows.52  
While these conditions may alleviate some of the risks associated with 
PPPs, problems may still persist throughout the entire process.  
II.  THE PROBLEM 
While Nigeria and South Africa constantly remain the largest 
economies in Sub-Saharan Africa, the quality of infrastructure in Nigeria 
would not lead one to believe it.53 While Nigeria and South Africa 
cumulatively account for almost half of Sub-Saharan Africa’s gross 
domestic product,54 a disparity exists between Nigeria’s development and 
South Africa’s.55 In 2015, the Economist Intelligence Unit profiled and 
ranked fifteen African countries for their operational maturity.56 Of the 
fifteen countries, South Africa was the only country with sufficient market 
depth to finance long-term investment.57 Ranking first in operational 
maturity, South Africa is also the only country on the list with a 
                                                        
51  ECONOMIST INTELLIGENCE UNIT, supra note 7, at 31. 
52  See supra note 8. 
53  Matthew Davies, South Africa Regains Africa's ‘Biggest Economy’ Title from Nigeria, BBC 
NEWS (Aug. 11, 2016), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-37045276. Nigeria’s “power sector's 
operational efficiency and cost recovery is among the worst in Africa, supplying about half of what is 
required, with subsequent social costs of about 3.7 percent of GDP.” See Vivien Foster & Nataliya 
Pushak, Nigeria's Infrastructure: A Continental Perspective (World Bank, Policy Research Working 
Paper No. WPS5686, 2011), 
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/819441468077937967/Nigerias-infrastructure-a-
continental-perspective. “Water and sanitation in Nigeria are inefficiently managed and operated with 
very low levels of pipe coverage.” Id. In regards to its potential, Nigerian irrigation development is 
very low. Id. Lastly, the transportation sector is deficient, with poor road networks and no 
maintenance. Id. Its air transport safety has also been subpar. Id. 
54  See Doya, supra note 5. 
55  See generally ECONOMIST INTELLIGENCE UNIT, supra note 7 (quantifying disparities 
between development in fifteen African nations) . 
56  Id. at 6-7. 
57  Id. at 9-10.  
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“Developed” overall score in its capacity to carry out sustainable PPPs.58 
Nigeria ranked twelfth with an “Emerging” capacity to carry out 
sustainable PPPs.59 Many factors illustrate why South Africa’s 
infrastructure regime is so far ahead of Nigeria’s, such as its strong 
regulatory and legal frameworks.60 
A. Regulatory & Legal Frameworks 
Legislation and surrounding policies frame how project procurement 
occurs. While international organizations do not completely preempt the 
workings of solely national infrastructure projects, it is beneficial to 
understand the global, continental, and regional bodies before exploring 
the national regulatory frameworks within Nigeria and South Africa.  On a 
global level, the OECD has outlined recommendations for PPPs in its 
Principles for Public Governance of Public Private Partnerships 
(“Principles”).61 These Principles “provide concrete guidance to policy 
makers on how to make sure that PPPs represent value for money for the 
public sector.”62 The Principles offer a set of guidelines that may be 
adopted by regulatory bodies within states. With a “growing body of 
international evidence [pointing] to the importance of a favorable 
regulatory environment,”63 the Principles offer fundamental steps for 
developing sustainable PPP infrastructure projects. While neither Nigeria 
nor South Africa are OECD member states, they both have strong 
partnerships with the OECD and its member states.64 With OECD 
partnerships and PPP guidelines, Nigeria and South Africa have a 
reference framework, used by many in the international community, to 
guide them in formulating their national frameworks. 
 Regionally, there are no concrete African regulatory agencies that 
govern African PPPs. However, some effort has been made to identify and 
                                                        
58  See id. at 9.  
59  Id.  
60  See generally id. 
61  OECD, supra note 4. 
62  Id. A Value for Money analysis measures the relative costs of a project procured using 
traditional public procurement methods and compares it with a PPP. PRACTICAL LAW FIN., supra note 
34, at 6. By comparing the costs and benefits of traditional public procurement with a PPP, the public 
agency can determine the best value over the life of the project. Id. 
63  OECD, supra note 4, at 11. 
64  See generally South Africa and the OECD, OECD, http://www.oecd.org/southafrica/south-
africa-and-oecd.htm (last visited Jan. 31, 2018); NEPAD-OCED Africa Investment Initiative, OECD, 
http://www.oecd.org/daf/inv/investment-policy/africa.htm (last visited Jan. 31, 2018); Nigeria, OECD, 
http://www.oecd.org/countries/nigeria/ (last visited Jan. 31, 2018). 
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address the issues facing the political, legal, and regulatory environments 
affecting PPPs. For example, the United Nations Economic Commissions 
for Africa (UNECA) and NEPAD have implemented a draft framework 
focused on the harmonization of policies, laws, and regulations to enhance 
private investment in African infrastructure.65 This harmonization 
framework was presented to the African Union (AU) Assembly in 2017.66 
In 2016, PIDA also cooperated with the African Forum for Utility 
Regulators (AFUR) to create the African Centre of Excellence for 
Infrastructure Regulation (ACEIR). ACEIR’s goal is to expand PIDA's 
scope and create a body of diverse, skilled professionals to find solutions 
to African infrastructural issues.67 Using the hub-and-spoke model, 
                                                        
65  The harmonization draft framework came after the 2014 Dakar Financing Summit (DFS) 
which emphasized a need for uniformity in order to enhance private-sector financing of trans-boundary 
infrastructure projects. NEPAD, supra note 26, at 19. Following the DFS, African Union (AU) heads 
of state requested the UNECA, NEPAD, relevant community members, and stakeholders to draft a 
regional framework which would harmonize policies, laws and regulations regarding private-sector 
investment in trans-boundary infrastructure projects. Id. UNECA then commissioned a study based on 
the following goals:  
1. to enhance the capacity of member states to accelerate the implementation of the Dakar 
Agenda for Action by agreeing on a common operational framework for private-sector 
investment in trans-boundary infrastructure;  
2. to garner comprehensive data on the available policies, laws and regulations relating to 
private-sector financing of trans-boundary infrastructure;  
3. to increase understanding on the degree of disharmony of the available policies, laws and 
regulations on infrastructure financing; and  
4. to accelerate the implementation of the Dakar Agenda for Action and, in particular, private-
sector investment in the 16 DFS projects.” This will lead to the development of a common 
regional framework for policies, laws and regulations on private-sector investment in trans-
boundary infrastructure projects. During 2015 and 2016, the UNECA and the NEPAD 
Agency undertook joint fact-finding and data-collection missions to countries in the SADC, 
ECOWAS, COMESA and the AMU to find key elements that will be need for such a 
framework. The draft framework was validated in mid-November 2016 and will be 
presented to the AU Assembly this year. 
Id. 
66  Id. 
67  The goal of the ACEIR is to create a “regional infrastructure development and management-
focused ‘center of excellence’” in order to develop Africa-specific models of regulation. Id. at 19. The 
ACEIR’s work will predominantly focus on energy, communication, transportation, and water. Id. at 
20. The ACEIR will be comprised of regulatory practitioners, professors, researchers, and internal staff 
members who will collectively research relevant areas such as engineering, economics, political 
science, public administration and law. Id. After such research, the ACEIR will publish and implement 
capacity-building initiatives for regulators, government officials and operators as well as policy 
dialogues between these parties. Id. Currently, it is “projected that ACEIR will be financed by AFUR 
members from donations from regulated African firms and operators, partner institutions and 
international development partners.” Id. 
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ACEIR is intended to be a network of institutions throughout all five 
African regions recognized by the AU.68  
There has since been no publication on the status of either of these 
regulatory efforts. Even with the prospect of trans-boundary infrastructure 
regulatory bodies and frameworks, the projects the ACEIR will oversee 
and whether these bodies will be effective remains unknown. With many 
national regulatory agencies incapable of following through or fully 
executing their regulatory provisions,69 the African Union will need to find 
a mechanism to implement a regulatory framework that can be fully 
administered regionally.  
While there are no regional regulatory bodies,70 the Western and 
Southern African regions possess bodies focused on development and 
economic growth: The Economic Community of West African States 
(ECOWAS)71 and the Southern African Development Community 
(SADC).72 The ultimate goal of these organizations is to encourage 
integrated economic activity.73 Like the European Union, ECOWAS may 
implement regulations and directives which must be followed by member 
                                                        
68  The hub-and-spoke structure is scheme where several actors, each remaining individually 
managed, pool their assets and information together and contribute to a central objective. Id. The hub 
is considered the central vehicle where information will be pooled. Id. ACEIR’s main hub secretariat 
will be NEPAD and AFUR. Id. The spokes are the smaller, individually managed entities which will 
report their findings to the hub. Id. Selected AFUR members as well as regional academic institutions 
will be the spokes. Id. 
69  
Ghana, for example, has strong rules concerning project preparation, but there is 
a shortage of skills for managing such processes, while Uganda’s PPP unit is not 
yet able to execute the full range of tasks required of it in the draft law. 
Moreover, PPP institutions are not always fulfilling their potential. Egypt and 
Cameroon have dedicated PPP units, but they are not as fully engaged as was 
intended.  
ECONOMIST INTELLIGENCE UNIT, supra note 7, at 10. 
70  In 2011, Nigeria’s Infrastructure Concession Regulatory Commission “championed the 
establishment of an African PPP Network (AP3N) to serve as a regional platform for sharing 
experiences and peer-learning and development of best practices for PPP projects in Africa.” 
Milestones, INFRASTRUCTURE CONCESSION REG. COMMISSION, www.icrc.gov.ng/about-
icrc/milestones. Eight countries were represented during the inaugural meeting. Id. Since then, there 
has been no documentation evidenced in the ICRC Milestones of further AP3N Network meetings. Id. 
71  ECOWAS is an AU-recognized regional organization focused on the economic integration 
and self-sufficiency of its member states. History, ECON. COMMUNITY OF W. AFR. STS., 
http://www.ecowas.int/about-ecowas/history/. Such integrated economic industries include 
manufacturing, transportation, telecommunications, energy, agriculture, natural resources, commerce, 
monetary and financial issues, and social as well as cultural matters. Id.  
72  SADC is an AU-recognized regional organization focused on regional integration and 
poverty eradication within Southern Africa through economic development and ensuring peace and 
security. Id. SADC's goal is to enhance the quality of life of the people of Southern Africa through 
regional integration and sustainable development. Id. 
73  See supra notes 70-71.  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol18/iss3/9
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states.74 ECOWAS implemented the Infrastructure Projects Preparation 
and Development Unit (PPDU),75 which governs the preparation and 
development of regional infrastructure projects.76 Like PPDU, the SADC 
includes the Infrastructure and Services Directorate, which focuses 
“specifically on the development and quality of strategic infrastructure in 
the Southern African region.”77 With the norms and standards set forth in 
these extranational organizations, Nigeria and South Africa have been able 
to create PPP regimes for national projects.  
 
1. Nigeria 
 
Relatively recently in its history, from 1999 to 2007 Nigeria produced a 
series of regulatory documents and assessments which led to the 
legislative implementation of PPPs.78 Implementation and regulation of 
                                                        
74  
Regulations have general application and all their provisions are enforceable and 
directly applicable in Member States. They are enforceable in the institutions of 
the Community. Decisions are enforceable in Member States and all designated 
therein. Directives and their objectives are binding on all Member States. The 
modalities for attaining such objectives are left to the discretion of States.  
Regulations Directives & Other Acts, ECOWAS, http://www.ecowas.int/ecowas-law/regulations-
directives-and-other-acts. 
75  Established in 2014, the infrastructure Projects Preparation and Development Unit is an 
ECOWAS specialized agency which leads the preparation and development of regional infrastructure 
projects. Infrastructure Projects Preparation and Development Unit, ECOWAS, 
http://www.ecowas.int/specialized-agencies/ecowas-infrastructure-projects-preparation-and-
development-unit-ppdu. The goal of PPDU is to “make financial regional infrastructure projects 
through the elaboration of feasibility studies (economic, financial, social, environmental, impact, 
etc.).” The functions of the PPDU include: 
1. Identify, select and prioritize regional integration infrastructure projects, in 
consultation with the ECOWAS Commission, member States and the private sector;  
2. Mobilize the resources required for project preparation and infrastructure financing;  
3. Strengthen capacities, assist/support national and intergovernmental structures in 
charge for the implementation of infrastructure programs and projects; and  
4. Promote public-private partnerships in infrastructure financing. 
Id. 
76  Id.  
77  Infrastructure & Services, SADC, http://www.sadc.int/sadc-secretariat/directorates/office-
deputy-executive-secretary-regional-integration/infrastructure-services. 
78  Regulatory and Policy Documents for PPP in Nigeria 
Regulatory and Policy Documents Year Published 
Privatization and Commercialization Act 1999 
Nigeria: Country Procurement Assessment Report, Volume I 2000 
Nigeria: Country Procurement Assessment Report, Volume II 2000 
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PPPs is led by Nigerian government agencies.79 Two main sources of PPP 
regulation originated from these documents and assessments: the 
Infrastructure Concession Regulatory Commission Act80 and the Public 
Procurement Act of 2007.81 Addressing Nigeria’s infrastructural gaps, the 
Infrastructure Concession Regulatory Commission Act (ICRCA) provides 
for the participation of the private sector in “financing the construction, 
development, operation, or maintenance of infrastructure or development 
projects of the Federal Government through concession or contractual 
arrangements.”82 The ICRCA in turn established the Infrastructure 
Concession Regulatory Commission (ICRC) to regulate infrastructure PPP 
endeavors of the Federal government.83 The Public Procurement Act 
                                                                                                                              
The Infrastructure Concession Regulatory Commission Act 2005 
The Fiscal Responsibility Act 2007 
The Public Procurement Act 2007 
 
Nehemiah Yakubu Sanda et al., A Review of Public-Private Partnership for Building and 
Infrastructure Procurement in Nigeria, 6 DEVELOPING COUNTRY STUD. 5, 9 (2016). 
79  See ECONOMIST INTELLIGENCE UNIT, supra note 7, at 11. 
80  “The Infrastructure Concession Regulatory Commission Act was enacted in 2005 and 
created the Infrastructure Concession Regulatory Commission to manage PPP transactions at the 
federal level. Since then, a number of transactions have been consummated using the PPP model in 
different sectors of the Nigerian economy.” George Nwangwu, The Legal Framework for Public-
Private Partnerships (PPPs) in Nigeria: Untangling the Complex Web, 7 EUR. PROCUREMENT & PUB. 
PRIV. PARTNERSHIP L. REV. 268, 269 (2012). 
81  The Public Procurement Act of 2007 requires “public institutions and other relevant parties 
to ensure that all public procurements are conducted in a manner that is transparent, timely and 
equitable and based on the agreed guidelines, thresholds and standards.” UDO UDOMA & BELO-
OSAGIE, PUBLIC PROCUREMENT (2012), http://www.lexmundi.com/document.asp?docid=4978. In 
order for a contract to be awarded, the Tenders Board must award procurements goods, works and 
services within the threshold set in the regulations. Public Procurement Act (2007) Cap. (A14), § 22 
(Nigeria). 
82  Infrastructure Concession Regulatory Commission (Establishment, Etc) Act (2005) Cap. 
(A18) (Nigeria). 
83  The ICRC “provides the regulatory and institutional framework for federal government 
ministries, departments and agencies (MDAs) to effectively partner with the private sector for 
infrastructure projects.” What We Do, INFRASTRUCTURE CONCESSION REG. COMMISSION, 
http://www.icrc.gov.ng/about-icrc/what-we-do/. The functions of the ICRC include: 
1. Promoting, facilitating, supporting and coordinating implementation of a 
sound PPP Process, while ensuring that principles of good governance are 
applied to all of the functions that form part of it;  
2. Providing guidelines and transaction support and building capacity in all 
Federal Government Ministries, Agencies and Departments (MDAs) for 
project development, tendering, negotiation and contract execution;  
3. Developing guidelines for monitoring contract compliance during 
construction, operation and contract termination and supporting the MDAs 
assigned to this task; and 
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(PPA) constituted the Bureau of Public Procurement, which is responsible 
for providing a legal and institutional framework for public procurement 
in Nigeria.84 The powers of the Bureau of Public Procurement generally 
encompass regulating pricing standards and benchmarks, and “attain[ing] 
transparency, competitiveness, cost effectiveness and professionalism in 
the public sector procurement system.”85 Along with general PPP 
legislation, sector-specific legislation has also been passed to regulate 
various services, especially in public utilities sectors.86 
The aforementioned laws, however, only pertain to federal bodies 
undertaking federal projects.87 Thus, each Nigerian state government has 
autonomy over PPP units, projects, laws, and regulations within state 
borders.88 The only way state governments are subject to federal 
regulations is through government funding.89 Furthermore, additional 
                                                                                                                              
4. Collaborating with other agencies, including similar state-level PPP units, to 
implement a cohesive national legal, policy and regulatory environment that 
is conducive to private sector investment in Nigeria’s infrastructure 
projects. 
Id. 
84  The objectives of establishing the Bureau of Public Procurement include:  
1. Harmonize existing government policies and practices on public 
procurement and ensure probity, accountability and transparency in the 
procurement process;  
2. Establish pricing standards and benchmarks; Ensure the application of fair, 
competitive, transparent, value-for-money standards and practices for the 
procurement and disposal of public assets; and  
3. Attain transparency, competitiveness, cost effectiveness and 
professionalism in the public sector procurement system. 
Who We Are, BUREAU OF PUB. PROCUREMENT, http://www.bpp.gov.ng/who-we-are/. 
85  BUREAU OF PUB. PROCUREMENT, http://www.bpp.gov.ng. 
86  Examples of sector specific legislation include the Electric Power Sector Reform Act, 2005, 
which provides the statutory framework for participation of private companies in electricity 
generation, transmission, and distribution, and establishes the Nigerian Electricity Regulatory 
Commission (NERC), to regulate activities in the electricity sector, as well as the Federal Highways 
Act (2004) Cap. (F13), which empowers the Minister of Transport to construct federal highways, 
operate toll gates and collect tolls on the federal highways. Akasemi Ollor, George Etomi & Veronica 
Alaba Oyedeji, Public Private Partnerships, GETTING THE DEAL THROUGH (November 2017), 
gettingthedealthrough.com/area/71/jurisdiction/18/public-private-partnerships-nigeria. 
87  Neil Cuthbert & Udayan Mukherjee, Legal Insight: Overview of PPP Laws/Frameworks in 
Selected African Jurisdictions, DENTONS (2016), 
https://www.dentons.com/en/insights/newsletters/2016/december/7/dentons-chinca-mea-project-
reporter/dentons-chinca-mea-project-reporter-edition-2/legal-insight-overview-of-ppp-laws-
frameworks-in-selected-african-jurisdictions.  
88  ECONOMIST INTELLIGENCE UNIT, supra note 7, at 22. 
89  Many state PPPs are financed and supported by the Federal Government. Hauwa 
ModuKumshe et al., Public-Private Partnership and Nigeria’s Infrastructural Development: A 
Panacea for Economic Growth, 2 INT'L J. HUMAN. SOC. & SCI. 87, 91 (2015) (While “each State is 
responsible for its own investment projects, many PPP projects within a State will be financed with the 
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funding can be obtained through sub-government guarantees with the help 
of international organizations and agencies such as the World Bank.90 
As each Nigerian state has the autonomy to create its own laws and 
regulations, there is an imbalance where some states have comprehensive 
regulation while others have little or no legal framework governing PPPs 
at all. For example, Lagos State enacted its Public Partnership Law in 
2011,91 and Rivers State enacted the Rivers State Public-Private 
Participation in Infrastructure Development Law in 2009.92 In contrast, 
Kogi State’s Public Private Partnership Law was passed in 2014, and the 
Bureau for Public Private Partnerships was established in 2016.93 A major 
cause for the inconsistency across states is the preference of awarding 
contracts “to private firms to execute a project designed and financed by 
governments,” which results in far less oversight, a higher chance of 
corruption, and fewer available funds.94 Nigeria has a comparatively 
extensive regulatory and legal regime for PPP procurement and delivery at 
the federal level, while state legislation is still nonexistent or in its infancy, 
leading to a lack of available investment funds.95 
 
 
                                                                                                                              
support of a guarantee by the Federal Government. In providing any such guarantees, the government 
will have regard to best practices as exemplified by its own PPP policy and guidelines.”). 
90  It should be taken into consideration that various agencies of the World Bank work through 
the federal government (i.e., provision of sub-sovereign guarantees to Nigerian states). Ollor, Etomi & 
Oyedeji, supra note 86.  
91  Similar to the ICRCA, the objective of the Lagos State Public Partnership Law is to initiate, 
develop, and advise on public infrastructure and development strategies. Lagos State Public 
Partnership Law (2011).  
92  Rivers State Public-Private Participation in Infrastructure Development Law (2009).  
93  Kogi State Public Private Partnership Law (2014); Kogi State’s Bureau for Public Private 
Partnership focuses on a Government-to-Business model where building relationships for the 
formation of PPPs at the State and local levels in order to increase quality goods, services, and 
facilities. Relatively new, the Bureau was established in March 2016. Bureau of Public Private 
Partnership to Drive Kogi Economy – DG BP3, KOGI REP. (Mar. 14, 2017), 
http://kogireports.com/bureau-of-public-private-partnership-to-drive-kogi-economy-dg-bp3.  
94  In Nigerian publication, This Day Live, Deputy Governor of Osun State, Senator Iyiola 
Omisore discussed bottlenecks in Nigerian infrastructure. “Infrastructure procurement by state 
governments is still largely tied to the old model of contract awards to private firms to execute a 
project designed and financed by governments,” noting that the utility of PPP projects has been highest 
in Lagos state, which implements a model that leverages private expertise more fully. Nume Ekeghe, 
Omisore: Why Nigeria Has Poor Infrastructure, THIS DAY (Nov. 28, 2016), 
https://www.thisdaylive.com/index.php/2016/11/28/omisore-why-nigeria-has-poor-infrastructure. 
With procurement based on government rather than private financing, there remains a shortage of 
investable funds for infrastructure. Id. 
95  Many of Nigeria’s local state governments and municipalities do not have laws regarding the 
implementation of PPPs. Because most of the states continue to utilize private contract procurement, 
there has not been a push for such laws. See Ekeghe, supra note 94.  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol18/iss3/9
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2. South Africa 
 
South Africa’s regulatory bodies are informed by PPP legislation and 
heavily influential guidelines. The foundation of South Africa’s PPP 
framework is attributed to the 1997 creation of a PPP task force.96 The 
most pertinent legislation for PPP regulation is the Public Finance 
Management Act (PFMA).97 The PFMA aims to promote “financial 
management in order to maximize service delivery through the effective 
and efficient use of the limited resources.”98 While the PFMA does not 
directly address PPPs, it governs all PPP procurement and delivery. 
Directly addressing PPPs, the PPP Manual and Standardized PPP 
Provisions are issued as Treasury PPP practice notes in terms of the 
PFMA.99 Further, the Municipal Finance Management Act (MFMA) was 
created to modernize financial management and create a governance 
framework for the various players within local government.100 These 
                                                        
96  In April 1997, the South African Cabinet approved the appointment of an inter-departmental 
task team to develop a package of policy, legislative and institutional reforms to create an enabling 
environment for PPPs.  
Pioneering PPP projects were undertaken between 1997 and 2000 by the SA 
National Roads Agency for the N3 and N4 toll roads; by the Departments of 
Public Works and Correctional Services for two maximum security prisons; by 
two municipalities for water services; and by SA National Parks for tourism 
concessions. Drawing early lessons from these projects and from international 
experience, a Strategic Framework for PPPs was endorsed by Cabinet in 
December 1999. 
Public Private Partnership, NAT’L TREASURY PPP UNIT, http://www.ppp.gov.za/Pages/About.aspx.  
97  “The PFMA promotes the objective of good financial management in order to maximize 
service delivery through the effective and efficient use of the limited resources.” Legislation – Public 
Finance Management Act, NAT’L TREASURY, http://www.treasury.gov.za/legislation/pfma.  
98  The key objectives of the PFMA are based on the following goals: 
• Modernize the system of financial management in the public sector; 
• Enable public sector managers to manage, but at the same time be held 
more accountable; 
• Ensure the timely provision of quality information; and 
• Eliminate the waste and corruption in the use of public assets. 
Id. 
99  The South African National Treasury’s PPP Manual is a best practice guide that informs 
public and private parties throughout the phases of the PPP project cycle for both national and 
provincial governments. Containing nine modules, each module is issued as a National Treasury PPP 
Practice Note in terms of the PFMA. Public Private Partnership Manual, WORLD BANK, 
https://ppp.worldbank.org/public-private-partnership/library/public-private-partnership-manual-
national-treasury-ppp-practice-notes-issued-terms-public-0. Read together with the PPP Manual, the 
Treasury's Standardized PPP Provisions is a guideline addressing the common issues in PPP projects. 
Id. 
100  The MFMA aims to modernize budget, accounting and financial management practices by 
placing local government finances on a sustainable footing in order to maximize the capacity of 
municipalities to deliver services to communities. MFMA, NAT’L TREASURY, 
 
Washington University Open Scholarship
 
 
 
 
 
 
706    WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY GLOBAL STUDIES LAW REVIEW    [VOL. 18:691 
 
 
 
 
legislative acts and guidelines inform the manner in which South Africa 
regulates PPPs. 
Unlike Nigeria, South Africa has a central public-private partnership 
unit, the Government Technical Advisory Centre (GTAC),101 which is an 
independent entity that reports to the National Treasury.102 Formally 
established in 2012, the GTAC advises and supports the Treasury 
regarding major infrastructure procurement projects, PPPs and service 
delivery improvement programs.103 The objective for a centralized unit 
such as the GTAC is to have a hub of experts implementing and 
supporting the overall PPP process.104  
Despite the centralized hub of experts implementing the PPP process, 
many believe the national rules are not effective on the municipal level 
and thus cause confusion.105 In fact, PPP stakeholders found an 
overlapping conflict between the MFMA and the Municipal Systems Act 
(MSA) which addresses the municipalities.106 Municipalities also struggle 
                                                                                                                              
http://mfma.treasury.gov.za/Pages/Default.aspx (last visited Jan. 15, 2018). It also aims to put in place 
a sound financial governance framework by clarifying and separating the roles and responsibilities of 
the council, mayor, and officials. Id. 
101  The “Government Technical Advisory Centre (GTAC) is an agency of South Africa’s 
National Treasury, and was formally established in March 2012. GTAC provides advisory and 
technical consulting services to South African organs of state, and contributes to public service 
research and capacity building.” Overview, GOV’T TECHNICAL ADVISORY CTR. (GTAC), 
https://www.gtac.gov.za/about-us/overview (last visited Jan. 15, 2018).  
102  South Africa, PPP KNOWLEDGE LAB, https://pppknowledgelab.org/countries/south-africa 
(last visited Jan. 15, 2018). 
103  Prior to 2012, the former Technical Assistance Unit of the National Treasury, the former 
Public-Private Partnership Unit, the National Capital Projects Unit, the Expenditure Performance 
Review Programme, and the Jobs Fund’s project management unit were separated entities which was 
later consolidated into the GTAC. See Frequently Asked Questions, GOV’T TECHNICAL ADVISORY 
CTR. (GTAC), https://www.gtac.gov.za/Pages/faqs.aspx. 
104  Centralized units “create a center of knowledge and expertise that can provide individual 
departments with technical assistance during the creation process of a PPP and keep a watchful eye on 
departments through its regulatory approval mechanism.” AKINTOLA AKINTOYE & MATTHIAS BECK, 
POLICY, MANAGEMENT AND FINANCE OF PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS 85 (2008). Further, units 
with centers of expertise heighten the confidence of potential private investors. Id.  
105  The Office of the Presidency of South Africa and the Business Trust requested the Castalia 
Consortium to prepare a report identifying the challenges faced by South Africa’s PPPs in 
infrastructure. SUPPORT PROGRAMME FOR ACCELERATED INFRASTRUCTURE DEV. (SPAID), KEY 
CHALLENGES TO PUBLIC PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS IN SOUTH AFRICA: SUMMARY OF INTERVIEW 
FINDINGS 1 (2007) [hereinafter SPAID], www.castalia-advisors.com/files/12345.pdf. The Castalia 
Consortium interviewed individuals from the private sector, implementing agencies, and government 
agencies responsible for PPP policy. Id. at i. Private sector actors as well as the various agencies 
responsible for PPP policy both find that the rules for PPPs do not work well for municipalities. Id. 
However, the staff of the PPP Unit has been working to solve these problems. Id. at ii.  
106  The Municipal Systems Act was enacted in November 2000 in order to provide the 
mechanisms and processes necessary to assist the advancement of municipalities both socially and 
economically. See Municipal Systems Act 32 of 2000 (S. Afr.). Both, the MFMA and MSA, require 
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with ensuring the availability of sufficient human capital and resources to 
effectively implement the projects.107  
As in Nigeria, in South Africa “capacity and skills shortages in 
government departments and provinces tend to constrain the pace at which 
the South African government is able to roll out PPPs.”108 Municipality 
government officials found parts of the MSA to be a mechanism to show 
the government’s ineffectiveness.109 Lastly, municipalities face great risk 
in budgeting multi-year outlays required by PPPs without receiving multi-
year allocations for those projects.110 With these gaps at the local 
government level, there is great need for PPP laws and regulations focused 
on the municipal level as well as stronger general enforcement of such 
laws. 
 
 
                                                                                                                              
that feasibility studies be conducted for a PPP. Id. Because these studies are not identical, there have 
been discrepancies between the interpretation of the MSA regarding what the studies should include 
and the extensiveness of the analysis. SPAID, supra note 105, at 7-8. Municipal laws are also more 
complex than at the national level. ECONOMIST INTELLIGENCE UNIT, supra note 7, at 38.  
107  Experts interviewed believed municipalities faced human resource constraints which were 
not experienced on the national level. There is a need for higher technical support and “basic supply 
chain management and procurement management skills, to the extent that they were having trouble 
spending conditional grants intended to address infrastructure backlogs.” See SPAID supra note 105, 
at 8.  
In general, municipalities need education, awareness and training on the 
functions, benefits, challenges and other implications of PPP models. Lack of 
technical, management and legal capacity of municipalities make it difficult for 
PPP models to be successfully implemented in local government. Even though 
the results have indicated that investors or financiers have interest in local 
government water infrastructure, lack of technical oversight remains a challenge.  
Cornelius Ruiters & Maselaganye P Matji, Public-Private Partnership Conceptual Framework and 
Models for the Funding and Financing of Water Services Infrastructure in Municipalities from 
Selected Provinces in South Africa, 42 WATER SA 291, 294 (2016), 
https://dx.doi.org/10.4314/wsa.v42i2.13. 
108  See AKINTOYE & BECK, supra note 104, at 95. 
109  “Many interviewees said municipal government officials view Section 78 [of the MSA] as at 
best, an onerous bureaucratic process addition to the requirements of the MFMA [or,] at worst, a 
requirement to demonstrate their own ineffectiveness or redundancy versus private operators.” See 
SPAID, supra note 105, at 8. 
110 This risk is considerably higher for municipalities than for national and provincial 
governments because municipalities require approval from the Treasury for PPPs. Treasury allocations 
come in the form of  
equitable shares or conditional grants [and] are not guaranteed for 20-30 years 
in the future. The remainder would need to come from municipal tax revenues 
of fees for basic services, yet many municipalities have been reluctant to use 
their full revenue raising powers, and unable or unwilling to fully collect fees 
for basic services.  
Id. at 9. 
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B. Enforcement, Trnasparency & Effectiveness 
1. Nigeria 
In theory, Nigeria’s extensive regulatory regime creates a sound 
foundation for legal enforcement of PPP procurement, delivery, and 
enforcement.111 In practice, there have been many setbacks regarding 
contract enforcement, transparency, and efficiency in PPP projects.112 The 
ICRC and Bureau of Public Procurement are the regulatory bodies 
responsible for ensuring all parties are held accountable for their 
performance.113 Unfortunately, though these bodies address enforcement 
as key objectives, implementation of enforcement programs is lacking.114  
 The ICRC plays a statutory role in monitoring the overall effectiveness 
of the Government's PPP policy.115 Instead of maintaining its own dispute 
settlement entity, the ICRC outlines guidelines for “Alternate Dispute 
Resolution”116 that should be expressly stated within the contract.117 These 
dispute resolution proceedings are essentially dependent on the contracting 
parties, who can request the ICRC to oversee arbitration.118 Without 
concrete legal enforcement, implementation of PPP contractual duties is 
especially weak because of the imbalance of political power between 
                                                        
111  See ECONOMIST INTELLIGENCE UNIT, supra note 7, at 35.   
112  Id.  
113  See supra, notes 82-83. 
114  See ECONOMIST INTELLIGENCE UNIT, supra note 7, at 35. 
115  Adedolapo Akinrele, Zelda Odidison, Jumoke Onigbogi & F.O. Akinrele & Co., Nigeria, in 
INTERNATIONAL PROJECT FINANCE AND PPPS: A LEGAL GUIDE TO KEY GROWTH MARKETS 22 
(Jeffrey Delmon & Victoria Rigby Delmon eds., 2010).  
116  
The PPP contract should specify a procedure for handling disputes under the 
terms of the PPP contract. A dispute resolution clause will set out that the parties 
will submit to dispute resolution in the event of any conflict. The most suitable 
method/s of dispute resolution would be adopted by the parties. The most 
common types of ADR for civil cases are mediation, settlement conferences, 
neutral evaluation, negotiation, fact finding, and arbitration. 
ICRC, LEGAL & REGULATORY FRAMEWORKS 16 (2019), 
www.icrc.gov.ng/assets/uploads/2017/09/Legal-Regulatory-Framework-for-PPPs.pdf. 
117 “PPP contracts will include clauses dealing with the resolution of disputes, and the ICRC may 
in some circumstances be used to arbitrate or provide advice within its wider public sector mission.” 
ICRC, NATIONAL POLICY ON PUBLIC PRIVATE PARTNERSHIP NIGERIA 26 (2013).  
118 Id. 
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private and public actors.119 However, there are occasional circumstances 
where the threat of legal enforcement is persuasive.120 
An additional bottleneck to the proper implementation of PPPs is 
transparency during the procurement stage. The Bureau of Public 
Procurement provides the legal framework regarding transparent 
procurement of PPPs.121 With issues like favoritism and closed-door 
negotiations, the true motivations for selecting a bidder can be opaque.122 
Furthermore, some banking institutions have highlighted questionable 
practices in awarding contracts and whether those awards are corrupt.123 
The Bureau of Public Procurement has a protocol in pursuit of contractual 
remedies,124 but the PPA does not list the measures that constitute 
corrective action at various stages during the dispute resolution process.125 
Lack of transparency in the implementation of existing rules has led to 
many public officials taking advantage of such conditions.126 Overall, 
                                                        
119  “Politically powerful actors can steer legal processes in their favour, while private operators 
have been known to use the threat of a lawsuit when a dispute arises to force their government 
counterparty to bend to their demands.” ECONOMIST INTELLIGENCE UNIT, supra note 7, at 35. 
120  The “judiciary occasionally upholds PPP operator and investor rights and arbitration rulings, 
but the process can be slow.” Id.  
121  See BUREAU OF PUB. PROCUREMENT, supra note 85.  
122  “Despite formal processes, closed-door negotiations do take place,” sometimes allowing for 
favoritism. See ECONOMIST INTELLIGENCE UNIT, supra note 7, at 35. While a relationship of trust and 
understanding can be cultivated over time, closed-door negotiations have the potential to place newer 
and more qualified bidders at a disadvantage. Id.  
123  Many question whether Nigeria has used “objective economic factors as the primary 
consideration in final project and contract awards.” Id. at 36. Banking institutions in particular have 
stated that many PPP projects “are not properly packaged. In other words, they do not clearly outline a 
business case, or a clear path to profitability.” Id. 
124  Section 54(1) of the Public Procurement Act allows bidders to seek “administrative review 
for any omission or breach by a procuring entity under the provisions of [the] Act.” Public 
Procurement Act (2007) Cap. (A14), § 54.1 (Nigeria). Section 54(2) of the Public Procurement Act 
mandates such complaints must first be submitted in writing to the accounting officer of the procuring 
entity. Procurement Act (2007) Cap. (A14), §54.2. Section 54 (3) of the Public Procurement Act states 
the bidder may make a complaint to the Bureau within ten business days after receiving a decision 
from the accounting officer. Procurement Act (2007) Cap. (A14), §54.3. 
125  
[P]resumably the accounting officer may set aside an improper decision and 
substitute his or her own decision for the decision of the procurement official. It 
is not clear, however, whether, and in what contexts, the accounting officer may 
offer further remedies such as damages, the suspension of contract performance, 
or the termination of a contract. Where a complaint is filed before the BPP, the 
BPP may provide yet further remedies to an aggrieved bidder. Thus, the BPP may 
suspend any further action by the procuring authority until the BPP renders a 
decision. 
Sope Williams-Elegbe, The Reform and Regulation of Public Procurement in Nigeria, 41 
PUB. CONT. L.J. 339, 361 (2012).  
126  Not only has there been concern for transparent, meticulous, and comprehensive regulation 
of PPP public procurement, but there has also been great concern due to the lack of a supervisory 
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these gaps in the procurement process have caused uncertainty to the 
detriment of quality PPPs and the rights of those affected.127 
Lastly, effective implementation of PPPs is stymied by corruption and 
lack of experience. In several studies detailing explanations for the slow 
uptake of PPPs, many found corruption to be the biggest issue.128 Because 
Nigerian states are notorious for their corrupt private contract practices, 
the likelihood that private investors will be interested in entering into PPPs 
with state organizations is relatively low.129 In addition to corruption, lack 
of experience among officials responsible for negotiating or carrying out 
PPPs has continued to hinder the procurement and implementation of 
PPPs. From the lack of knowledge among procurement officials130 to bank 
financing inexperience131 to the potentially corrupt awarding of 
contracts,132 PPP projects suffer from the consequences of poor or 
unsophisticated governance. While there are many ways for the developers 
                                                                                                                              
mechanism charged with the implementation of public procurement rules. Id. at 341. Lack of a 
supervisory mechanism equipped public officials with wide discretion “in conducting and managing 
the procurement process, which could easily be exploited, especially in a culture where corruption is 
endemic.” Id. 
 
127  
The lack of clear regulation in public procurement also fostered unpredictability, 
as contract award criteria or guidelines could be changed at any time and also 
facilitated the award of contracts on a noncompetitive basis. This often meant that 
the Government did not receive value for money, especially where nepotism or 
cronyism prevailed.  
Id. 
128  In a survey determining the achievements using PPPs, the elimination of corruption ranked 
the lowest benefit. This evidence suggests corruption does not get eliminated but rather is adapted to 
fit the model. Abdullahi A. Umar, Noor Amila Wan Abdullah Zawawi, Mohd Faris Khamidi & Arazi 
Idrus, Stakeholder Perceptions on Achieved Benefits of PFI Procurement Strategy, 7 MOD. APPLIED 
SCI. 4, 36-37 (2013). Another study ranked corruption in the government as being the most severe 
cause of slow PPP adoption in Nigeria. AbdulGaniyu Otairu, Abdullahi A. Umar, Noor Amila Wan 
Abdullah Zawawi, Mahmoud Sodangi & Dabo B. Hammad, Slow Adoption of PPPs in Developing 
Countries: Survey of Nigerian Construction Professionals, 77 PROCEDIA ENGINEERING 188, 191 
(2014). 
129  Otairu, Umar, Zawawi, Sodangi & Hammad, Slow adoption of PPPs in developing 
countries: Survey of Nigerian Construction Professionals, supra note 128, at 193. 
130  Interviews conducted with procurement officials showed that the “capacity of procurement 
officials remains a challenge. There was a clear difference in levels of understanding of the 
procurement function between procurement officials in high-profile and low-profile ministries, with 
high-profile ministries possessing staff with a higher degree of understanding.” See Williams-Elegbe, 
supra note 125, at 365. 
131  “Another strong challenge hinges on lack of experience in project financing by bank officials 
and technical expertise.” Olatunji Fadeyi, Abimbola Adegbuyi & Edwin Agwu, Assessment of Public-
Private Partnership on Infrastructural Development in Nigeria: Challenges and Prospects, 3 INT’L 
CONF. AFR. DEV. ISSUES 222, 222 (2016).  
132 See ECONOMIST INTELLIGENCE UNIT, supra note 7, at 36. 
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of Nigeria’s legal framework to cure its weaknesses and empower PPP 
projects, they have not done so yet.133 Although the regulatory bodies are 
present, they are not successfully enforcing the key aims of the ICRCA or 
PPA. Without enforcement, the likelihood of increased investment appears 
low.134  
2. South Africa 
South Africa’s PPPs are regulated by the Treasury Regulations, the 
PPP Manual, and the suggested content of the PPP contract (the 
“Standardized PPP Provisions”).135 South Africa is also notable for its 
Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment Act (the “B-BBEE”) and the 
Preferential Procurement Policy Framework Act 5 of 2000 (the PPPFA).136 
These acts are the primary sources for PPP enforcement, transparency, and 
fairness. South Africa’s regulatory and legal environment is generally of 
high standard, but challenges remain.137  
While some experts attribute the impressive design of PPP contracts to 
the South African legal community,138 some PPP players find such legal 
                                                        
133  “Nigeria’s legal framework does not sufficiently allocate responsibilities across institutions 
in ways that could lower transaction and operational costs, nor does it maintain checks and balances 
for scale and renegotiation risks, or provide strong incentives for enforcing high quality standards.” Id.  
134  See id. (noting that banking insitutions claim PPP projects in Nigeria do not provide “a clear 
path to profitability”). 
135  See generally infra Section III A.2. 
136  The key objective of the B-BBEE was to  
promote the achievement of the constitutional right to equality, increase broad-
based and effective participation of black people in the economy and promote a 
higher growth rate, increased employment and more equitable income 
distribution and establish a national policy on broad-based black economic 
empowerment so as to promote the economic unity of the nation, protect the 
common market, and promote equal opportunity and equal access to government 
services.  
Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment Act (2003) Cap. (53) (Nigeria). 
Encompassing the B-BBEE, the Preferential Procurement Policy Framework Act 5 of 2000 and the 
Preferential Procurement Regulations of 2001 establish the obligation of government to award 
preferential procurement points to enterprises owned by historically disadvantaged persons, including 
females. Preferential Procurement Policy Framework Act 5 No. 5 of 2000, WORLD BANK GRP. PUB.-
PRIVATE-P’SHIP LEGAL RES. CTR., https://ppp.worldbank.org/public-private-
partnership/library/preferential-procurement-policy-framework-act-5-no-5-2000. 
137  “At the regulatory level, subnational legislation is more complex than at the national level, 
and risk is generally greater for local projects. Some private-sector players consider local content 
requirements to be too demanding, and there are cumbersome administrative processes.” See 
ECONOMIST INTELLIGENCE UNIT, supra note 7, at 38. 
138  See generally Nathanael Bruchez, Public Private Partnerships (PPPs) in South Africa: To 
What Extent Are PPPs Suitable for the Long-term Development of Infrastructure in South Africa? 
(Apr. 22, 2014) (unpublished Masters thesis, University of Bern), 
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implementation lacking.139 Private sector actors,140 implementing 
agencies,141 and government agencies each have separate grievances for 
the deficiencies of the legal framework.142 However, a common complaint 
among stakeholders has been the inconsistent leadership, enforcement, and 
commitment to PPPs horizontally, vertically, and inter-temporally.143 
Inconsistencies also exist among investors on whether South Africa’s 
robust “dispute resolution mechanisms, detailed quality indications, and 
clearly designated responsibilities” are either enticing or too strict.144 
A centralized PPP oversight framework, like South Africa’s PPP 
structure, brings advantages such as “better coordination, increased 
efficiency and a clustering of relevant skills in a single place.”145 Located 
at the highest levels of government, there is clear buy-in from key decision 
makers.146 However, the centralized PPP framework also has major 
concerns and bottlenecks. For example, centralized PPP frameworks 
suffers from a lack of transparency and the association of projects with 
individual national leaders.147 Some investors also believe the procurement 
process disproportionately favors government due to an asymmetry of 
information, whereby awards are based on information unavailable to 
                                                                                                                              
http://www.rechtswissenschaft.unibe.ch/unibe/portal/fak_rechtwis/content/e6024/e6025/e118744/e144
658/e271902/files271934/BruchezNathanael_Masterarbeut_ger.pdf.  
139  The National Treasury possesses a strong legal framework; however, there was a lack of 
leadership on “why and under which circumstances PPPs should be used to achieve policy goals.” See 
SPAID, supra note 105, at 3. 
140  Private sector experts found that at the provincial and national level, the legal rules to be 
better suited for high value transactions in more developed PPP markets. Id. at 10. These rules are also 
inefficient at the municipal level. Id. In addition, private actors found the PPP Unit micromanages 
transactions. Id. 
141  Implementing agencies “refer to national line departments, provincial government agencies, 
and municipalities”; these agencies have found the treasury rules for procuring PPPs too onerous or 
confusing. Id. 
142  Government agency actors responsible for PPP policy found legal rules for smaller value 
projects needed to be streamlined. Id. 
143  During the interviews held by the Castalia Consortium, many interviewees noted political 
inconsistencies. Id. at 3. Horizontally, policy direction on PPPs differed between line departments, 
provinces, and municipalities. Id. For example, some national departments supported the use of PPPs, 
while others were not as supportive. Id. In addition, policy and committed weaknesses existed which 
caused troubles when filtered down to government managers in charge of managing PPP transactions. 
Id. Lastly, commitment to PPPs is difficult due to the changes in political leadership. Id. at 4. The life 
of a PPP can be up to twenty years, and thus is exposed to the harms to the development of the policy 
environment for PPPs. Id. 
144  See Bruchez, supra note 138, at 40. 
145  See ECONOMIST INTELLIGENCE UNIT, supra note 7, at 11. 
146  Id.  
147  When these projects are associated with singular people instead of the broader institutional 
system, there can be a lack of involvement across key governmental departments who are necessary in 
the later stages of the PPP cycle. Id. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol18/iss3/9
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investors and judged under unpublished standards.148 Along with concerns 
of information asymmetry, there are also long-term planning concerns that 
PPPs are solely a vehicle for securing large amounts of funding rather than 
the actual project.149 Lastly, changes in political leadership continue to 
cause concern for investors who fear new leaders will not honor projects 
approved by previous parties.150 Without measures in place to ease the 
concerns of investors, it will be difficult to continue to receive investment 
for such long term projects.  
 
C. Social & Cultural Frameworks 
 
1. Nigeria 
 
In order for PPPs to be successful and long lasting, stakeholder 
management must be seriously considered.151 Diverse stakeholders require 
tailored communication in order for their needs to be met.152 Although 
revenue risk can be transferred to the end-user,153 stakeholder buy-in and 
quality work is necessary to ensure a willingness to pay.154 Articulating the 
                                                        
148  Id.  
149  A critique of South Africa’s PPPs is whether or not they actually transfer risk or improve 
long-term planning. Id. at 12. Rather, some individuals see PPPs solely as a vehicle for financing 
rather than a service delivery. Id. 
150  “Commitment to PPPs suffers from the fact that policy on PPPs changes with changes in 
political leadership. Many interviewees also noted that frequent leadership changes within the PPP 
Unit had to some extent harmed the development of the policy environment for PPPs in South Africa.” 
Id. at 4.  
151  Stakeholders are those organizations and communities most affected by the project 
development. R. Osei-Kyei & A.P.C. Chan, Developing Transport Infrastructure in Sub-Saharan 
Africa Through Public-Private Partnerships: Policy Practice and Implications, 36 TRANSPORT REVS. 
170, 180 (2016). This includes banks, investment funds, non-governmental organizations, labor 
unions, government and multilateral funders, community and party leaders, public service users, 
regulatory agencies, society in general, and the press. Who Are The Stakeholders? APMG INT’L, 
https://ppp-certification.com/ppp-certification-guide/121-who-are-stakeholders (last visited Jan. 15, 
2018 ). 
152  As there are many bodies to be considered, they must all be communicated with differently 
based on their needs. See generally R. Osei-Kyei & A.P.C. Chan, supra note 151, at 180.  
153  “The underlying principle in Nigerian PPP transactions is that risks are allocated to the party 
best able to manage them. Revenue risks may be transferred to the private party when the costs of the 
service are being transferred to the end-users.” See Ollor, Etomi & Oyedeji, supra note 86. 
154  “The toll tariff gives the user a direct cost and the user can then make a decision on whether 
he will benefit sufficiently from ‘buying’ the road or if using an alternative would be more 
favourable.” Collins Mudenda, Road Tollıng in Zambia: A Literature Review, 32 INT’L J. SCI.: BASIC 
& APPLIED RES. 105, 110-11 (2017); “This has the benefit of acting as an incentive for the private 
party to increase the quality of the service,” because if the quality of service is poor, the end-user will 
not be willing to pay for the service. See Ollor, Etomi & Oyedeji, supra note 86. 
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shared interests of the country, private parties, and end-users is important 
in maintaining a level of trust.155 Without their buy-in and shared 
investment in the project, many problems may arise.156 Nigeria has faced 
several protests, strikes, and blatant refusal to pay PPP-related taxes and 
tolls.157 This has come at the expense of all parties in the PPP process, 
because tariffs are necessary for the upkeep of the roads as well as the 
financial obligations to lenders.158 
In order to fulfill long-term, high-value projects, the horizontal 
division159 and vertical power relationships of a nation must be 
                                                        
155  Some citizens and stakeholders, especially end-users, oppose PPPs because of their fear the 
PPP method may be a conduit for official corruption. See Martin Oloruntobi Dada & Olukayode 
Sunday Oyediran, The State of Public Private Partnership in Nigeria, in PUBLIC PRIVATE 
PARTNERSHIPS: A GLOBAL REVIEW 248, 253 (Akintola Akintoye, Matthias Beck, & Mohan 
Kumaraswamy eds., 2016).  
156  “Oppositions arise when end-users feel that they have not been adequately consulted or 
catered for in PPP projects such as highways that require tolling when alternative routes have not been 
provided.” Id. During the Economist’s Future Cities conference in Lagos, Mariam Yunusa, Project 
Leader for the UN World Urban Forum, stated “PPP needs to be changed to public-private people 
partnership (PPPP).” The Role of Public-Private Partnerships in Africa, VENTURES AFRICA (Oct. 26, 
2013), http://venturesafrica.com/role-public-private-partnerships-building-industries-thrive/. “There is 
a third ‘P’ that should be added to that so it will succeed, because when the government and the private 
sector agree, [in conjunction with] social capital, that makes these kinds of agreements work.” Id. 
157  The Lekki-Epe Express Toll Road is the first private toll project in Africa outside of South 
Africa. African Development Bank, Lekki Toll Road Project - A Gateway to Nigeria's Economic 
Transformation, ALLAFRICA (Apr. 30, 2013), https://allafrica.com/stories/201305021086.html. 
However, the Lekki-Epe Expressway has faced many challenges. For example, in December 2011, 
several protests, counter protests, traffic gridlock, and disorder took place once drivers were charged a 
toll fee. Jude Njoku, Olasukanmi Akoni & Bose Adelaja, Lekki: Protests, Traffic Crisis as Tolling 
Begins, VANGUARD (Dec. 19, 2011), https://www.vanguardngr.com/2011/12/toll-crisis-traffic-snarl-
as-tolling-begins; Uwem Essia & Abubakar Yusuf, Public-Private-Partnership and Sustainable 
Development of Infrastructures in Nigeria, 3 ADVANCES MGMT. & APPLIED ECON. 113, 118 (2013). In 
November 2017, the announcement of an increase in toll gate fees led to social media backlash and 
online petitions to protest the planned bill. Wale Odunsi, Lagos Government Halts Lekki Toll Hike as 
Residents Blast Ambode, LCC, DAILY POST (Nov. 4, 2017), http://dailypost.ng/2017/11/04/lagos-govt-
halts-lekki-toll-hike-residents-blast-ambode-lcc. Due to the great uproar following the increased fees, 
the Lagos State Government suspended the proposed tariff hike. Id. Most recently, in January 2018, 
unusually slow traffic at the toll gates was attributed to motorists claiming they were unaware of the 
new tariffs and unprepared to pay more. Bennett Oghifo, Nigeria: New Toll Tariffs Take Effect at 
Lekki and Ikoyi Plazas, THIS DAY (FEB. 2, 2018), allafrica.com/stories/201802020675.html. 
158  The Lekki-Epe Expressway began tolling in December 2011 and “had remained the same 
despite the increase in the cost” of operations. Id. Without increasing their tariffs, especially with the 
influx of foreign exchange rates, road maintenance and loan obligations to both local and foreign 
lenders would not be met. Id. 
159  “Horizontal division, such as that which is apparent in all oil-dependent countries between 
the charmed elites and the masses of poor,” are more divided and perform worse than homogenous 
ones because of disputes over the “division of the spoils.” Nicholas Shaxson, Oil, Corruption, and the 
Resource Curse, 83 INT'L AFF. 1123, 1128 (2007). In contrast, “societies unified by a common culture 
and strong middle class create a consensus for growth[,]” which includes the poor. Id. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol18/iss3/9
 
 
 
 
 
 
2019]             A COMPARISON OF PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS  
 
 
 
 
715 
considered.160 Nigeria is a multi-ethnic country whose history of ethnic 
clashes has led to political, ethnic and militant groups.161 Considering the 
social and ethnic relationships between the stakeholders is a necessary 
component to ensure the success of PPP implementation. Without buy-in 
from such stakeholders, it will be difficult to gain a return on this 
enormous investment. 
 
2. South Africa 
 
Culture, communication, and trust are all elements necessary for 
successful PPPs. Although the social and cultural makeup of Nigeria and 
South Africa are different, acts like the B-BBEE and PPPFA recognize 
marginalized citizens in a way that Nigerian law does not.162 South 
Africa’s local content requirement is an investment in its people which 
fosters social, economic, and political trust.163 Such local content 
requirements not only mandate certain percentages of marginalized 
citizens to be included in projects, but also create the establishment and 
demand for services and goods in various markets.164 With these markets 
                                                        
160  Vertical relationships address the relationship between citizens and the state. “To get ahead 
individuals look upwards to get access . . . and compete against, rather than collaborate with fellow 
citizens.” Id. at 1129. 
161  Such groups include the Movement for the Emancipation of Niger Delta, Movement for the 
Actualisation of Sovereign State of Biafra, Odua People’s Congress, Boko Haram, Arewa Peoples’ 
Front, Egbesu, Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People, Ijaw Youth Congress, Niger Delta 
Peoples’ Volunteer Force, Niger Delta Vigilante Group. Ben E. Odigbo, Raphael Valentine Okonkwo 
& Joy Eleje, Conflicts Management for Public Private Partnership and Economic Development in 
Nigeria through Social Marketing Tools, 2 INT. J. ECON. COM. & MGMT. 1, 6 (2014). 
162  Although apartheid did not exist in Nigeria, there have been cultural divides between ethnic 
groups. Christopher McCrudden, Social Policy Choices and the International and National Law of 
Government Procurement: South Africa as a Case Study, 2009 ACTA JURIDICA 123, 133-40 (2009). 
South Africa’s efforts to include black people and women to gain access, wealth, and equality has been 
beneficial to the overall South African economy. Id. Senator Iyiola Omisore stated “it is important that 
we do not gloss over the political and cultural issues that often constitute major disincentives to public 
procurement, via PPP arrangement.” Odinaka Anudu, Public-Private Partnership: Panacea to 
Nigeria’s Infrastructure Decay, BUS. DAY (Dec. 8, 2016), 
https://businessday.ng/opinion/article/public-private-partnership-panacea-to-nigerias-infrastructure-
decay/. 
163  Local content requirements mandate that a certain value of purchased goods and services 
must be sourced locally. Christopher Ettmayr & Hendrik Lloyd, Local Content Requirements and the 
Impact on the South African Renewable Energy Sector: A Survey-Based Analysis, 20 S. AFR. J. ECON. 
& MGMT. SCI. 1 (2017). “The argument for this tool is that spending is localized and manufacturing, as 
well as job creation, can be stimulated because industry will need to establish in the host economy.” 
Id. 
164  Market strength and potential growth must first be tested. South Africa’s commitment to a 
renewable energy program has established a market for independent power producers and 
manufacturers. Id. at 3. With the establishment of this market as well as present demand, there is 
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comes the need for skilled workers; however, there appears to be a 
deficiency in local workers with the required skills.165 The number of 
skilled workers that can do such projects is low, and those who can may 
not be skilled enough to participate in the projects effectively.166 The result 
is a tension between the rigidness of local content requirements in order to 
build revenue within South Africa and the need to source foreign labor to 
ensure that fulfillment of such projects is completed effectively and 
efficiently.167 
In addition, communication to all stakeholders must exist to avoid 
disruption. As in Nigeria, South Africa’s PPP-related price changes have 
led to protests and refusal to pay tolls on PPP-financed projects.168 In 
2012, tens of thousands of protestors marched in protest of the electronic 
tolls on the new Gauteng PPP-financed highway.169 Labor groups argue 
paying tolls as well as high taxes to get to work is unfair and will 
negatively impact the poor.170 Government officials claim the impact to 
the poor is exaggerated,171 but in considering issues like diverted traffic,172 
the government’s apparent lack of substantiation for its claims is troubling. 
In addition, South Africa’s government was criticized for its lack of public 
communication prior to approving the Gautrain Rapid Rail Link.173 
Without the inclusion of stakeholders like the end-users, unilateral 
                                                                                                                              
potential for expansion. Id. “Because a strong supplier support was listed as a key driver, the existence 
of local manufacturers and suppliers of renewable energy technologies, components and ancillary 
items would be conducive to investment attraction.” Id.  
165  There have been ongoing tensions due to the influx of foreign labor. Id. However, the 
necessary skills are not present in the host countries. Id. at 8-9. 
166  “South Africa possesses some technical skills to support investment in the renewable energy 
sector, but not at a level sufficient to support it effectively . . . . [R]eadily available skilled persons . . . 
[are] difficult to obtain, and although there is capability . . . , the number of persons able to offer their 
services to the market is limited.” Id.  
167  Id. at 7.  
168  See ECONOMIST INTELLIGENCE UNIT, supra note 7, at 38. South Africans March in Mass 
Protest at Toll Roads, BBC (Mar. 7, 2012), www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-17283803. 
169  “It was one of the biggest marches in recent years, and looked like the mass demonstrations 
against the apartheid system during the 1980s and 1990s, says the BBC's Milton Nkosi in 
Johannesburg.” BBC, supra note 167. 
170  Id.  
171  Id. 
172  “When tolls were implemented on the N1 between Pretoria and Bela-Bela in South Africa, a 
traffic diversion of 30-40% to the non-tolled alternative was experienced. This traffic diversion can 
have serious impacts on regular users of the alternative route.” Mudenda, supra note 154, at 110. 
173  “There is no mention of public consultation. The Gautrain Rapid Rail Link project has been 
criticized for lack of significant public consultations and legislative debates before it was approved and 
put to tender.” Madeleine C. Fombad, Accountability Challenges in Public-Private Partnerships from 
a South African Perspective, 7 Afr. J. Bus. Ethics 11, 15 (2013). 
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decisions continue to diminish the accountability and integrity of South 
Africa’s PPP regimes.174  
Further, stakeholder mistrust of private sector involvement in 
infrastructure and PPPs id prevalent.175 The PPP tendering process remains 
opaque, with many questioning whether the process’s anticorruption 
systems are simply another form of corruption.176 This mistrust has thrived 
in an environment where government officials, banking officials, private 
agencies, and other relevant parties have repeatedly been caught abusing 
the process.177 
III. PROPOSED SOLUTION 
Nigeria and South Africa both face very similar challenges regarding 
regulatory and legal enforcement, corruption, and cultural and social 
concerns. However, it appears that South Africa’s centralized PPP 
                                                        
174  “The non-disclosure of PPP contracts to the public raises issues of accountability, and could 
compromise perceptions of the government’s integrity.”  Id. 
175  
Many individuals in the highest levels of leadership in national line departments, 
provinces, and municipalities mistrust private sector involvement in 
infrastructure. Powerful political constituencies also harbor strong suspicions of 
PPPs. Political leaders and their constituents dislike PPPs because of:  
 
• Mistrust of private sector intentions, or more specifically, a belief that the 
private sector will try to take profit while shirking its responsibilities to 
provide infrastructure or infrastructure services. This belief often goes hand-
in-hand with the belief that the public sector will always lose out when 
negotiating commercial contracts with the private sector because the private 
sector can bring more resources to bear in the negotiations 
• Fear of losing control of infrastructure assets, authority, or responsibilities. 
Political leaders may dislike private sector involvement in infrastructure 
because of a fear that they will have to cede responsibilities, authority, or 
control of infrastructure assets. Many constituencies dislike PPPs for similar 
reasons, namely, that the private sector will destroy, rather than create jobs 
• The detailed planning and outside scrutiny that PPPs require. PPPs require more 
work than traditional government procurement and subject government 
procurement to extensive scrutiny (and potential criticism) from the PPP 
Unit, the public, and other government agencies. Political leaders or other 
government officials may prefer to avoid such scrutiny because they view it 
as interference or micro-management. 
See SPAID, supra note 105, at 8-9. 
176  “As in most other African countries, in South Africa, the tendering process is still perceived 
to be riddled with corrupt practices in what has become known as tenderpreneurship.” See Fombad, 
supra note 173, at 15. 
177  In 2003, the former South African Minister of Transport resigned as a director of First Rand 
Bank, after allegedly accepting gifts and payments of more than R500,000 from a former fundraiser of 
a political party whose company was part of the winning N3 toll road consortium. Id. at 16.  
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framework, regulated local content requirements, and strong legal system 
have allowed it to be more successful in this regard than Nigeria. In order 
for Nigeria’s PPP regime to progress, a centralized-local hybrid PPP unit 
should be implemented. In addition, thorough communication between 
cultural, ethnic, and regional communities is essential to make everyone 
feel that they have a voice in the conversation. Lastly, there is a need for 
program persistence on the national, regional, and continental level. In 
order for not only Nigeria but all African countries to become regionally 
independent, consistent development, analysis, and implementation of PPP 
and development programs are critical.  
A. Hybrid PPP Unit 
A hybrid PPP unit would consist of a central governmental body in 
charge of authorizing PPP projects with state and local government 
implementation. Because many state PPPs are government financed,178 a 
hybrid unit would streamline the PPP process. States would make their 
case for procurement of PPPs and the ICRC would approve and award 
PPP contracts. Skilled experts would be sourced in a central location 
which would quicken advancement of projects and operational processing 
times.179 Without such a national infrastructure scheme, development in 
Nigeria will remain decrepit, with some states completely lacking PPP 
regimes or the private financing to independently develop.180  
 Nigeria has an extensive but chaotic set of regulations, however, 
so understanding how all elements fit together and are to be properly 
implemented is nearly impossible.181 A hybrid unit requires the primacy of 
federal ICRC regulations. However, legislative preemption would only be 
effective with concrete dispute resolution frameworks, legitimacy of 
judicial enforcement, and a skilled workforce to manage and enforce the 
streamlined PPP process.182 Therefore, the ICRCA must be amended to 
consider these factors along with a mechanism to reconcile the ICRCA 
                                                        
178  See ModuKumshe et al., supra note 89, at 91.  
179  Central units carry out a range of functions and coordinate across government actors. Nigeria 
has struggled with delayed government payments for contractors. Such an issue is a deterrent for 
future investors as well as banks lenders. See ECONOMIST INTELLIGENCE UNIT, supra note 7, at 10-11.  
180  As Omisore stated, many states still use private contracts for projects. The issue with such 
projects is the use of government funding, causing a lack of investable funds. However, with a large 
deficit in the funding needed to build sustainable, necessary infrastructure, Nigeria will need more than 
government funding in order to foster growth and development. See Ekeghe, supra note 94. 
181  See generally supra Section B. 
182  “Ghana, for example, has strong rules concerning project preparation, but there is a shortage 
of skills for managing such processes.” ECONOMIST INTELLIGENCE UNIT, supra note 7, at 10.  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol18/iss3/9
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with other PPP related legislation. For example, the ICRC should also 
encompass sector-specific agencies and regulations in order to promote 
transparency and continuity.183 Having all of these bodies under one 
umbrella would provide oversight and accountability that could deter 
corrupt behavior.184 
With the most skilled experts working at the central hub of the PPP 
unit, the issue of capacity and skill shortages in many states within Nigeria 
would still remain.185 However, starting with a central unit would allow 
Nigeria to see where such gaps exist and how to address them. Although 
the process of reform is laborious, Nigeria will need to invest in Nigerians 
through education and professional training programs and incentivize 
skilled Nigerians to remain in or return to Nigeria.  
B. Social and Cultural Considerations 
The end-user is often overlooked. Although individual citizens outside 
of the PPP process are likely  pay the taxes that fund the framework of 
PPP, many feel left out of the conversation.186 Not only are ordinary 
citizens ignored, but they are also subject to projects thrust upon them by 
leaders they do not trust. With users convinced the PPP model is just 
another road to official corruption, they will continue to strike, protest, and 
fight against PPPs. The greatest consequence is that investors and lenders 
may be deterred from providing much-needed capital for PPP 
infrastructure projects.  
To deal with the sense of distrust among ordinary citizens, Nigeria 
must implement policies similar to the B-BBEE and PPPFA. Recognition 
of and collaboration with marginalized populations can have similar 
affects in Nigeria, where tribal/ethnic, religious, and socioeconomic 
divides continue to hinder progress.187 Such policies have the ability to 
create markets, stimulate demand, and provide training for citizens who 
might otherwise be displaced by foreign labor.188 
If Nigerian governments seek to utilize a PPP model where the costs 
are funneled to the end-user, there must be a sense of buy-in. Community 
                                                        
183  “In Nigeria . . . the road sector has more developed laws and practices than rail.” Id. at 16.  
184  See Williams-Elegbe, supra note 125, at 361.  
185  See Ettmayr & Lloyd, supra note 163, at 1. 
186  See generally Eric J. Boyer & David M. Van Slyke, Citizen Attitudes Towards Public-
Private Partnerships, 49 AM. REV. PUB. ADMIN. 259 (2019). 
187  Meg Handley, The Violence in Nigeria: What's Behind the Conflict?, TIME (Mar. 10, 2010), 
content.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1971010,00.html. 
188  See Ettmayr & Lloyd, supra note 163, at 1.  
Washington University Open Scholarship
 
 
 
 
 
 
720    WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY GLOBAL STUDIES LAW REVIEW    [VOL. 18:691 
 
 
 
 
leaders, business owners, labor unions, and other stakeholders should play 
a role in the deciding what projects should be approved through 
administrative process.189 The perceived and actual needs of these end-
users must align in order to avoid tensions and promote cooperation. This 
can only occur if they are being consulted extensively. Hikes in toll prices 
and taxes will be met with contention if they feel ignored, especially in an 
environment where corruption is such an issue. 
C. Program Persistence 
In order for PPPs to be taken more seriously and respected in Nigeria, 
persistence in the programs implemented is paramount. For example, it is 
unclear whether the African PPP Network is still in effect. In addition, 
PIDA drafted the harmonization framework and ACEIR.190 ACEIR 
especially sounded promising because of its ability to bring experts and 
scholars all over Africa to disperse information on best practices.191 
However, there has been no follow up on the progress of these programs. 
It is necessary to prioritize PPPs both domestically and regionally. As 
many African countries are devoted to economic growth and 
independence, this will likely only be possible by working together to 
grow collectively.  
CONCLUSION 
 Although Nigeria remains one of the wealthiest and most powerful 
countries in Africa, its people are suffering from bad roads, inconsistent 
energy supply, poor water quality, and an overall low quality of life. South 
Africa is far from perfect, but it has demonstrated a more consistent 
history of successful PPP projects over the years. Many factors contribute 
to this success, such as a strong legal community, a centralized PPP unit, 
and local content requirements. In order for Nigeria to progress, it will 
need to amend the ICRCA, increase the involvement of ordinary citizens, 
and implement lasting policies and programs to improve its PPP regime. 
Without these investments, investors will have no incentive to continue 
financing these projects. In addition, as surveys have shown, many people 
                                                        
189  “Integrated stakeholder meetings should be held from time to time at both national, states, 
local governments and community levels to sieve the feelings and opinions of the populace. These 
harvests of opinions will then be factored by policy makers into their social and security plans for the 
nation.” Odigbo, Okonkwo & Eleje, supra note 161, at 12. 
190  See Programme for Infrastructure Development in Africa (PIDA), supra note 28. 
191  See supra note 67.  
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believe that corruption will not decrease, but rather that officials will find 
other ways to continue taking advantage of the political and economic 
system while lining their own pockets. With protests as recent as January 
2018, it is clear the interests of the government are not aligned with end-
users. Without gaining their trust, end-users will not be willing to pay for 
the costs of the PPP projects. Thus, it is necessary for Nigeria to take its 
regulatory, legal, and social regimes seriously in order to progress in the 
PPP space.  
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